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Abstract
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by setting ineﬃcient public policies: (i) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents,
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1. Introduction
1. Introduction
By 2100, 85% of the world's population is expected to live in metropolitan areas (MAs) (UN,
2013).1 Today, this ﬁgure already reaches more than 50% of the world's population and roughly
80% of the OECD countries' population. Meanwhile, the economic strength of numerous MAs
is comparable to that of countries. MAs cover only 4% of the land area in the OECD countries
but account for 55% of their GDP (OECD, 2015). Because MAs are areas of residence for
most people and are creators of substantial economic wealth, their governance is a paramount
concern for policy makers worldwide. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy's statement is
illustrative: The Greater Paris is at the core of our strategy of attractiveness and economic
recovery. This project concerns all elected representatives.2
The gouvernance of MAs has two outstanding features compared to country governance.
First, MAs are characterized by competition among many sub-metropolitan or local govern-
ments (e.g. counties, municipalities, districts, and townships) for mobile jobs and mobile
residents. The governance of MAs is split among numerous local governments which often
have signiﬁcant autonomy to raise local revenue from residential, business and property taxes
for example, to ﬁnance a range of public services such as schools, amenities (e.g. public parks)
and safety.3 Mobility of private agents and autonomy of local public policy are a fertile ground
for competition among local governments.
Second, MAs are characterized by strong agglomeration of jobs in MA centers and high
mobility of households as residents and workers. Typically, MAs are composed of a large
central city surrounded by numerous small suburban towns. Many workers are attracted by
access to jobs and high wages in the central cities which cluster most activities. This concen-
tration of workers (and often also residents) in the central cities creates negative agglomeration
externalities such as congestion on amenities and public goods/services and various urban dis-
turbances (noise, waste, etc.). Expensive housing in the city spurs many residents to settle
in suburban towns where rents are more aﬀordable.4 These suburbanites are often obliged to
undertake long commutes to work in the city, which generate negative commuting externalities
such as traﬃc congestion and air pollution.5
1 MAs are urban agglomerations with more than 500 000 inhabitants (OECD, 2015).
2 Speech presenting the Greater Paris project delivered on April 29, 2009.
3 Brülhart et al. (2015) report that among the 10 most fragmented OECD MAs, a MA includes 542 local
governments on average. They surveyed 40 OECD and non-OECD countries, and show that on average,
10% of total national tax revenue is collected locally.
4 For example, in French MAs the land price of the most central parcels is roughly 85% higher than the price
in the most peripheral areas (Combes et al., 2018).
5 For instance, about half the workforces of London and Budapest spend more than 45 minutes commuting
daily (OECD, 2015).
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Little is known about how competing local governments (hereafter municipalities) handle
these negative externalities typical of MAs. The purpose of this paper is to enhance our
understanding of municipality public policy in the face of over-concentration of jobs in the
central business district of a MA. We focus on traﬃc congestion which, although probably
the most important type of negative externality in the cities (Fujita, 1989, p. 258), has
received little attention from economists interested in local public policies.6,7
This paper investigates (i) how traﬃc congestion aﬀects local public policies and, as a
corollary, (ii) which local policy instruments are the most relevant to tackle traﬃc congestion.
We develop an original spatial urban tax competition model which considers a MA consisting
of a set of municipalities: a large city surrounded by numerous small towns. Residents and
business capital are mobile across municipalities. Households and ﬁrms compete for land.
Households commute to work and incur commuting costs which include traﬃc congestion
costs. Competing municipalities have access to several local policy instruments:
1. A tax on mobile capital and a head tax on mobile residents. These taxes capture the
important features of local residential and business taxation in many countries; they are
the most studied taxes in the tax competition literature.8
2. Two key instruments allow municipalities to inﬂuence directly the number of workers
in their jurisdictions, and consequently, the level of traﬃc congestion incurred by their
residents: (i) a labor tax/subsidy which is based on the workforce employed in the mu-
nicipality; (ii) the provision of public goods which generate spillovers due to commuting.
The model allows households to consume local public goods not only as residents but
also as workers. While there are some local public goods that beneﬁt only to local res-
idents (e.g. local public schools), many are consumed also by local workers potentially
commuting from other jurisdictions (e.g. safety, street cleaning and road conditions).
These public goods make municipalities more attractive as workplaces and thus increase
local traﬃc congestion.
6 In 2018, in the ten most congested European cities, the overall travel time was 41% higher than in a free
ﬂow situation which represented a 2% rise compared to 2017. This ﬁgure rose to 69% and 77% during the
morning and the evening peaks respectively (TomTom, 2018). This has not escaped the attention of policy
makers, including Valérie Pécresse, President of the Paris Region who stated that the inhabitants of the
Paris Region are obsessed with spending less time in traﬃc jams (2/6/2019).
7 Most of our conclusions also apply to the other externalities mentioned above. Formal modeling of air
pollution induced by commuting is very close to our proposed modeling of traﬃc congestion (see e.g. Denant-
Boèmont et al., 2018). Besides, a previous version of this paper (Ly, 2018b) considers the case of negative
agglomeration externalities from public good congestion induced by commuters and provides ﬁndings in line
with those in the present paper.
8 The model also includes a tax on immobile land whose role is to allow municipalities to balance their budget.
It is not the primary interest of the paper.
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The main results of the paper are summarized below.
1. If towns can retain part of their workers using labor subsidies, the decentralized equilib-
rium is Pareto-eﬃcient. As intermediate outputs, the resulting original ﬁrst-best local
policies are characterized: public good provision optimally internalizes residents' and
commuters' preferences; residential taxes guarantee optimal access to business districts;
capital is not taxed.
This result highlights the key role of local labor subsidies in the regulation of traﬃc
congestion in MAs. However, in practice, this instrument is generally not available to
municipalities for three main reasons. First, subsidies are often considered violations of
competition rules. Therefore, legislation in the European Union, Canada, and Australia
for example, heavily limits use of subsidies (OECD, 2010; Thomas, 2010).9 Second,
subsidies are expensive. On the contrary, local labor taxation is often enacted as a
budgetary tool to supplement other local revenue sources. For example, the introduction
of payroll taxes in San Francisco in 1970 followed this logic (Sherwood-Call, 1986).10
Third, competition among local governments can lead to a subsidy race leading to rent-
seeking behavior by ﬁrms (Tannenwald, 2002).
2. If towns are not allowed to subsidize labor, traﬃc congestion in the city becomes exessive,
and local governments respond by setting ineﬃcient second-best public policies: (i) the
city over-taxes capital which leads to too little capital in the city; (ii) the city under-
taxes residents which leads to too many residents in the city; (iii) in the presence of
commuting-induced spillovers, local public goods are under-provided by the city and
over-provided by the towns.
In sum, if towns cannot retain their workers through the use of subsidies, the central
business district (CBD) attracts too many workers from the suburbs, leading to severe
traﬃc congestion in the city. The municipalities then use the other policy instruments
to dampen this excessive congestion: the city limits the size and attractiveness of the
9 In several US states, local governments are allowed to provide ﬁrms with development subsidies such as
tax breaks, low-cost loans, grants, infrastructure support and low-cost land (Warner and Zheng, 2013).
Development subsidies diﬀer from the ﬂat rate subsidies considered in this paper which are based on the
municipality's total workforce. Development subsidies are bilateral commitments involving a local govern-
ment and a ﬁrm. Since they are at the discretion of local politicians, they tend to favor big and highly
visible projects at the expense of less visible ones (Elkin, 2015). Moreover, since these subsidies are based
on ex-ante agreements, once established in the municipality, the ﬁrm might not fulﬁll its promises related
to job creation or other performance criteria (Sullivan and Green, 1999).
10 See Sjoquist and Stoycheva (2012) for an exhaustive list of the US states whose local governments use labor
taxation. In France, labor was taxed by municipalities from 1975 to 1999 (Bouvier, 2004). Peralta (2007)
reports on cases in Australia, Austria, Greece, Korea and Mexico.
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CBD, while the towns make their secondary business districts (SBDs) more attractive.
This result highlights in particular, the detrimental role of commuting-induced spillovers
which amplify the damage caused by traﬃc congestion by spurring the municipalities to
engage in ineﬃcient public good provision.
The paper updates our understanding of the governance of MAs in the context of typical
negative externalities such as traﬃc congestion, pollution and other disturbances due to the
agglomeration of jobs in MA centers and household mobility. The analysis suggests that
local governments may be using many of their policy instruments to help to tackle these
externalities. However, national governments often fail to give local authorities an important
role to address these externalities; most political solutions so far are either national  e.g. road
tolls and gasoline/green taxation (Pigou, 1912; Walters, 1961; Vickrey, 1963)  or regional
 e.g. integrated public transport provision (Preston, 2012). Further decentralization of the
ﬁght against MA negative externalities could be fruitful. Traﬃc jams and CO2 emissions, for
instance, can vary spatially to a signiﬁcant extent within a single MA. Thus, local governments
which are better informed about voters' preferences and habits could be more ﬂexible and
would be able to better target these externalities than national or regional governments. This
echoes Oates's (1972) decentralization theorem.
The main policy recommendation to emerge from the analysis is that suburban towns
should be allowed more leeway to retain their workers which might help to unclog MA roads
and reduce externalities such as air pollution. Local labor subsidies which are usually missing
in local policy instrument sets, could be an appropriate tool for this task. More generally, the
paper suggests that addressing the externalities typical of MAs will require the development
of truly polycentric MAs by encouraging the growth of strong secondary economic poles.
This recommendation is in line with Cavailhes et al. (2007); our paper stresses that local
governments could play an important role in this reshaping of MAs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
introduces the model. Section 4 presents the optimal public policy rules for a city and its
surrounding towns with and without access to labor taxes/subsidies. Section 5 provides a
numerical illustration. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature
This paper contributes to several literature streams. It is novel in proposing the inclusion
of a spatial urban structure (e.g. Fujita, 1989) in the standard capital tax competition model
developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) andWilson (1986). Thus, it links the local public
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economics (LPE) and the urban economics (UE) literatures.11,12 The proposed model is also
one of the ﬁrst to include both inter-jurisdictional residential mobility and commuting in a
capital tax competition framework à la Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).13 It links capital tax
competition models with residential mobility which exclude commuting (e.g. Wilson, 1995;
Brueckner, 2000) to models that include commuting but ignore residents' mobility across
jurisdictions (e.g. Braid, 1996, 2000; Peralta, 2007). Finally, our study of local government
responses to traﬃc congestion links the LPE literature and the transport economics literature
(e.g. Parry, 2002; Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2006) which tends to consider traﬃc congestion
from a national/regional government perspective.
Recent work on LPE reveals a trend towards inclusion of more real-life features of MAs
in the tax competition model à la Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). First, following Braid
(2000), some papers (e.g. Peralta, 2007; Legras, 2019) include costly commuting in the tax
competition model.14 Commuting costs are purely distance costs and do not include traﬃc
congestion; commuters do not inﬂict externalities on one another. Second, eﬀorts have been
devoted to include a core-periphery structure in tax competition models (Janeba and Osterloh,
2013; Gaigné et al., 2016), accounting for the fact that MAs are typically composed of a central
city surrounded by suburban towns. Traﬃc congestion stands at the crossroads of these two
approaches: it involves commuting costs typically incurred by suburbanites commuting to the
MA center.
This paper allows commuters to consume local public goods at their workplace.15 Since
Gordon (1983), the standard way to model local public good spillovers is to assume that
public goods provided in a jurisdiction beneﬁt indiscriminately all residents from neighboring
jurisdictions (e.g. Wellisch, 1993). In practice, commuters beneﬁt more than non-commuters
11 The LPE literature might be viewed by some to be a strand of the UE literature. However, these two bodies
of work are complementary. While LPE models consider endogenous local governments and generally ignore
the spatial dimension of MAs, UE models consider local government choices as exogenous but pay particular
attention to the spatial features of MAs.
12 Gaigné et al. (2016) proposes a tax competition model with a spatial urban structure. Our model is closer
to the standard tax competition models in that it includes endogenous public good provision and taxable
mobile capital which are probably the most prevalent features in the tax competition literature.
13 To our knowledge, only three recent papers account for capital, residents' and workers' mobility: Ly (2018a),
Ly and Paty (2019) and Agrawal et al. (2019). The paper by Agrawal et al. is particularly important and
describes how ﬁscal externalities and strategic behavior emerge when jurisdictions are atomistic in the capital
market but have market power in the labor market.
14 Since Braid (1996), costless commuting is more common in tax competition models. See e.g. Kächelein
(2014), Sas (2017) and Ly (2018a).
15 In most models with commuting (e.g. Braid, 1996, 2000; Ly, 2018a), residents and workers are disconnected so
that commuters are reduced purely to production factors which by nature, neither consume public goods nor
pay taxes. In an extension of their analysis, Gaigné et al. (2016) consider suburban commuters' consumption
of public goods in the city, but public good provision is ﬁxed exogenously.
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from neighboring jurisdictions' public goods. Our modeling of spillovers induced by commuting
reﬂects this. Moreover, workers' consumption of public goods also reduces the traditional
divide between public goods consumed by households and public inputs which beneﬁt ﬁrms
as is the focus in Matsumoto (1998, 2000).
3. The model
This section presents the model used for the analysis. Subsection 3.1 describes the model
basic economic and spatial structure and introduces traﬃc congestion, the central externality
in this paper. Subsection 3.2 describes households' behavior and introduces the commuting
spillover externality. Subsection 3.3 describes how ﬁrms choose their inputs and compete
with households for land. Subsection 3.4 derives the location system which characterizes the
distribution of capital, residents and workers in the MA resulting from subsections 3.1 to 3.3.
3.1. Metropolitan structure and commuting costs
The economy consists of a MA composed of n + 1 municipalities: one central city c and n
symmetric suburban towns si with i = 1, . . . , n. Residents, workers and business capital are
mobile across municipalities. City and towns diﬀer in two respects.
First, the MA is endowed with a hub-and-spoke commuting transportation network (Gaigné
et al., 2016) which means that the n towns si are connected only to the city c, while the city
has direct access to all of the towns in the MA. Therefore, having chosen a residence location,
an individual living in town si can work in her home town si or in the city c. All residents
living in c work in c. This MA structure is aimed at capturing the fact that suburbanites
usually hesitate between working in the city or in their home town. Commuting from the city
to the suburb or from one suburban town to another similar suburban town is less frequent.
Second, city and towns diﬀer in size as speciﬁed in the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Size).
(i) The city is suﬃciently large to directly inﬂuence all the town variables.
(ii) The towns are atomistic; they cannot inﬂuence the variables in other municipalities.
Assumption 1 is in line with patterns observed in most MAs which are characterized by strong
size asymmetry between city and towns as documented in Brülhart et al. (2015).16 The paper
adopts the following notations, for each municipality j, j′ ∈ {c; si}:
16 Brülhart et al. (2015) report that Paris, Hamburg, Vienna and New York for example, have respectively 268,
229, 199 and 179 times more population than the average populations of the municipalities in their MAs.
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. • Rj : number of residents living in j,
. • Wj : number of workers employed in j,
. • Wjj′ : number of residents living in j and working in j
′,
. • Kj : amount of business capital used in j,
. • Lj : amount of business land used in j,
. • Lj : land endowment of municipality j,
. • P : population of the MA,
. • K : capital endowment of the MA,
where Rj , Wj , Wjj′ Kj and Lj are endogenous variables of the model, while Lj , P and K are
exogenously ﬁxed. The capital resource constraint is:17
Kc +
n∑
i=1
Ksi = K. (e.1)
Fixed MA capital stock captures the fact that large cities often have market power in the
capital market.18 The results do not change with any ﬁxed number m > 1 of symmetric
MAs linked by capital and residential mobility sharing a ﬁxed capital stock. Recalling that a
proportion of the residents of si work in c whereas none of the residents of c work in si, we
have:
Rsi = Wsic +Wsisi , Wsi = Wsisi . (1)
Each individual is assumed to consume a single unit of land, so that local land market clearing
for each municipality j ∈ {c; si} requires:
Rj + Lj = Lj . (2)
The numbers of residents and workers may not coincide within a municipality but they do
coincide at the level of the MA since each individual chooses a workplace within the MA. The
population and workforce resource constraints are:
Rc +
n∑
i=1
Rsi = P (e.2)
17 For ease of reference, the key equilibrium conditions are numbered (e.1), (e.2), etc..
18 The sources of this market power are various. While in practice not all capital in a MA or region is ﬁxed, a
non negligible share of the savings of the MA citizens is channeled to regional banks which invest primarily in
regional ﬁrms (Janeba and Osterloh, 2013). In addition, some cities such as New-York, Paris and Singapore
are international ﬁnancial centers and concentrate a signiﬁcant share of the global capital stock.
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Wc +
n∑
i=1
Wsi = P. (e.3)
Jobs are concentrated in the CBD of the MA, as postulated in:
Assumption 2 (Concentration). Assume that the city employs at least one-third of the MA
workers:
Wc >
P
3
,
which is equivalent to Wc >
∑n
i=1Wsi/2 and at equilibrium Wc/n > Wsi/2 since the towns
are symmetric.
Assumption 2 is theoretically relevant for studying traﬃc congestion and is probably the most
common case in practice.19,20 Subsection 6.2 discusses our results if this assumption does not
hold.
−Lc/n
−A
0
B1
C1
D1
Ls
CBD
City's residents-workers
Town's commuters
SBD
Town's residents-workers
Town s1
−A
0
B2
C2
D2
Ls
Town s2 −A
0
B3
C3
D3
Ls
Town s3
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the MA, with n = 3.
For convenience, the spatial structure of the MA is depcited in Figure 1. The MA is
composed of n strips of 1 space unit width and Lc/n+ Ls space unit length. Thus, the total
area of the MA is Lc + nLs that is, the sum of the land endowments of the city and the n
towns. Each strip is an interval [−Lc/n,Ls] which links the center of the city, −Lc/n, to the
19 For instance, in 2016, among the 100 most populated French MAs, the central city accounted for 51% of the
MA's workforce on average; 87% of cities accounted for more than a third of their MA workforces. Source:
data collected from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
20 Gaigné et al. (2016) make a related assumption. They assume that more than a third of the MA's population
is concentrated in the city. Our assumption is less demanding since central cities usually employ a higher
number of workers than their number of residents.
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extremity of one of the n towns, Ls. The city is represented spatially by the union of the
n intervals [−Lc/n, 0]. Each of these intervals is divided between business land [−Lc/n,−A]
and residential land [−A, 0]. Since each household consumes one unit of land, we have:21
A ≡ Rc
n
. (3)
The CBD is the union of the intervals [−Lc/n,−A]. It represents the business land used by
ﬁrms located in the city whose total area is Lc = Lc −Rc.
Each town is represented spatially by the interval ]0,Ls]. For each town si, this interval is
divided into four subintervals:
• ]0,Bi] of length Wsic, is occupied by the residents of si who commute to the CBD.
• ]Bi, Ci] (resp. ]Di,Ls]) of length Wsisi/2, is occupied by half of the residents of si who
work in si.
22
• ]Ci,Di] of length Lsi , is the SBD of si.
Using (1) and (2), the following explicit expressions for Bi, Ci and Di result:
Bi ≡Wsic = Rsi −Wsi , (4)
Ci ≡Wsic +
Wsisi
2
= Rsi −
Wsi
2
, (5)
Di ≡Wsic +
Wsisi
2
+ Lsi = Ls −
Wsi
2
. (6)
Next, we introduce commuting costs. An individual who lives at location l and works at
location l′ incurs commuting cost:23
21 Notice that A does not depend on i which means that the amount of business land used by ﬁrms is the same
on each strip of the MA. This is because the ﬁrms in the SBD pay the same land rent per business land unit
regardless of which strip they are located on (see subsection 3.3).
22 At equlibrium, there are only two possible locations for the SBD: (i) central to the distribution of the town's
residents-workers; (ii) at the extremity of the town. We assume that the former case holds, e.g. for historical
reasons. Gaigné et al. (2016) argue that a central location would be the optimal choice for the municipalities.
Our results would be qualitatively similar with SBDs at the extremity of towns.
23 This modeling of commuting costs with traﬃc congestion is in line with Fujita (1989). For tractability, we
assume that c(l) is linear, and that the marginal congestion costs are same in the city and in the suburbs. The
linerarity of our traﬃc congestion function is consistent with structural models of traﬃc congestion (Arnott
et al., 1993). All the results derived in the paper can easily be generalized to any non-linear function of the
form:
T (l, l′) ≡
T˜ (l
′ − l) + ∫ l′
l
c
(
z −W+l′
)
dz if l < l′,
T˜ (l − l′) + ∫ l
l′ c
(
W+l′ − z
)
dz if l > l′,
with c(z) ≡ a zb,
for any diﬀerentiable function T˜ (·) and scalars a and b.
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T (l, l′) ≡

∫ l′
l c
(
z −W+l′
)
dz if l < l′,∫ l
l′ c
(
W+l′ − z
)
dz if l > l′,
with c(z) ≡ t+ a z, (7)
where W+l′ is the residence location of the individual working at l
′ living the farthest from l′.
c(l) is the marginal transportation cost at location l. Parameter a > 0 (resp. t > 0) captures
traﬃc congestion costs (resp. distance costs), as explained below. We assume that workers
incur no commuting costs within business districts: for example, an individual working in the
CBD pays only for commuting from her residence location to the boundary of the CBD, −A.24
To understand commuting costs (7), consider an individual working in the CBD, that is at
location l′ = −A, and living at location l ∈]−A,Bi] on one of the strips depicted in Figure 1.
The individual's commuting costs (7) can be written as:
T (l,−A) = t(l +A) + a
∫ l
−A
(Bi − z)dz, (8)
The ﬁrst part of (8), t(l + A), is the traditional distance commuting costs considered in the
literature (e.g. Braid, 2000; Peralta, 2007; Gaigné et al., 2016). Parameter t is the cost per unit
of distance.25 These costs (fuel, transport tickets, etc.) would be incurred by the commuter
even were she the only individual on the road.
The second part of (8), a
∫ l
−A(Bi − z)dz, is the continuous sum of the traﬃc congestion
costs that this individual incurs during the journey to work. At each location l0, this commuter
is on the road with Bi − l0 other commuters and pays the traﬃc congestion cost a(Bi − l0).
Deﬁnition 1 (Traﬃc jam). Parameter a > 0 is traﬃc jam intensity. It measures the
marginal traﬃc congestion cost induced by an additional commuter.
The key parameter a can be interpreted as the inverse of the transportation supply at each
location l. Deﬁnition 1 highlights the ﬁrst key externality in this paper. Traﬃc congestion
is not novel in the UE literature (see e.g. Fujita, 1989); however, to our knowledge, there are
no studies of such externalities in a context of competition among sub-central governments.
The study of traﬃc congestion in a tax competition context is allowed by the spatial urban
structure introduced in this model and by the identiﬁcation of commuters as residents.
24 This is similar to the assumption in Fujita (1989, chap. vii) and Zenou (2009, chap. vi). Equivalently, we
could assume that workers have the same random commuting cost whenever they enter a business district.
25 For simplicity, commuting costs are assumed to be monetary costs. This ignores time opportunity costs. We
do not think that this alternative formulation would provide dramatically diﬀerent results since agents are
homogeneous and thus earn the same wage if working at the same place.
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3.2. Households
All households are identical and composed of a single individual. An individual living at
location l in municipality j ∈ {c; si} and working at l′ in j′ ∈ {c; si} consumes xjj′ units of
a private numeraire good, and one unit of land paying land rent ρi(l), supplies inelastically
one unit of labor in j′ receiving wage wj′ , pays the commuting costs T (l, l′) and the local
residential head tax τRj .
Each household is endowed with k ≡ K/P units of capital and `j ≡ Lj/P units of each
municipality j's land: the MA's capital endowment K and each municipality j's land endow-
ment Lj are evenly distributed among all the households in the MA. Since k is invested in the
municipality providing the highest return, the equilibrium capital return r is identical in all
municipalities. The landowner of `j supplies it to the household or the ﬁrm making the highest
bid and pays the land tax τLj `j to municipality j.
26 The budget constraint of a household who
lives at location l in municipality j and works at location l′ in municipality j′ is:
xjj′ + ρi(l) = wj′ − T (l, l′)− τRj + rk + Γ. (9)
where Γ is the individual land income net of land taxation, whose explicit form can be found
in Appendix A. This individual's utility is:
xjj′ + U
j(Gj) + U
jj′(Gj′) ≡ xjj′ + U j + U jj′ , (10)
where Gj is the local public good provided by government j. The utility derived from public
good consumption is increasing and concave, that is U jG, U
jj′
G > 0 and U
j
GG, U
jj′
GG < 0, where
the subscripts denote derivatives.
Deﬁnition 2 (Commuting spillovers). Function U jj
′
measures beneﬁts earned by work-
ers from local public services and amenities (safety, road conditions, etc.) provided at their
workplace.
Function U jj
′
captures utility spillovers in local public good consumption induced by commut-
ing. Local authorities can make their municipality more attractive to workers by improving
these services and amenities.27 Typically, a resident of town si who considers commuting to
the city compares the sub-utilities of working in her home town, xsisi+U
sisi(Gsi), and working
in the city, xsic + U
sic(Gc). Her decision depends not only on private consumption xjj′ but
also on public good provision both in the city and in her residence town, captured by U jj
′
.
26 The competition for land between households and ﬁrms is in line with that introduced in Ly (2018a).
27 Local public goods limited to residents (e.g. local public schools) are not considered in the paper. General-
izing the paper results to such goods is straightforward.
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Deﬁnition 2 highlights the second key externality of this paper. To our knowledge, this model
is the ﬁrst to investigate local public good provision in the presence of commuting spillovers.
This is enabled by the fact that each commuter is identiﬁed as a resident whereas in previous
tax competition models commuters are pure private inputs, thus U jj
′
= 0 (e.g. Braid, 1996,
2000; Peralta, 2007; Kächelein, 2014; Ly, 2018a).
The indirect utility of a household residing in j at location l and working in j′ at location
l′ is:
V jj
′
(l) ≡ wj′ − ρi(l)− T (l, l′)− τRj + rk + Γ + U j + U jj
′
, (11)
where xjj′ has been substituted in (10) using (9). Residential mobility implies that every
resident in the MA obtains the same level of utility u at equilibrium. Equating the indirect
utility function (11) with the prevailing utility level u, and solving for ρi(l) allows us to
determine the residential bid land rent:
ψi(l) = wj′ − T (l, l′) + Λjj′ − u (12)
where Λjj
′ ≡ rk + Γ + U j + U jj′ − τRj , with j, j′ ∈ {c; si}. The bid land rent ψi(l) is the
maximum rent that a household working in j′ is willing to pay to live at location l.
The marginal resident of town si who is indiﬀerent between working in the CBD and
working in the SBD of si resides at location l = Bi which is characterized by:
V sic(Bi) = V sisi(Bi). (13)
3.3. Firms
In municipality j ∈ {c; si}, the private good is produced combining labor Wj , capital Kj and
business land Lj according to the production function F
j ≡ F j(Wj ,Kj , Lj) which represents
all local ﬁrms in municipality j. F j exhibits constant returns to scale and satisﬁes F jX > 0,
F jXX < 0 and F
j
XY > 0 for all X,Y ∈ {Kj ;Wj ;Lj}, which means that F j exhibits positive
but decreasing marginal returns with respect to each factor, and that factors are technological
complements.28 The proﬁt of the ﬁrms in municipality j is:
Πj ≡ F j(Wj ,Kj , Lj)− (wj + τWj )Wj − (r + τKj )Kj − ρLj Lj , (14)
28 Our main results hold whenever F j is homogeneous whatever its degree of homogeneity. Increasing returns
to scale  often interpreted as agglomeration economies (Burbidge and Cuﬀ, 2005)  were included in
a preliminary version of this model (see Ly, 2018b). However, constant returns to scale do not rule out
agglomeration economies. They can be included by assuming that factors are more productive in the city
than in towns, that is ∀ (W,K,L), F c(W,K,L) > F s(W,K,L), as assumed in the numerical example of
section 5.
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where wj is the wage prevailing in municipality j, r is the MA return to capital, ρ
L
j is the
municipal business land rent, τWj is the tax rate on labor levied by municipality j,
29 and τKj
is its capital tax rate. For each municipality j ∈ {c; si}, optimal demand for labor Wj and
capital Kj maximize Π
j and are characterized by:
F jW = wj + τ
W
j , (15)
F jK = r + τ
K
j , (16)
where F j 's subscripts stand for derivatives. Firms make no proﬁt at equilibrium, so that for
each municipality j ∈ {c; si}, Πj = 0. Solving the zero-proﬁt condition for ρLj determines the
business bid land rent:
ψLj = F
j
L. (17)
which is obtained by inserting (15), (16) and Euler's identity F j = F jWWj + F
j
KKj + F
j
LLj
into the zero-proﬁt condition. The bid land rent ψLj is the maximum rent that ﬁrms are
ready to pay for land Lj . Firms compete with households for land which implies that in each
municipality, the business bid land rent is equal to the residential bid land rent oﬀered by the
resident who lives the closest to the business district:30
ψLc = ψi (−A) , ψLsi = ψi (Ci) = ψi (Di) . (18)
Eliminating ψi(l), l ∈ {−A; Ci;Di} using (12) and ψLj using (17) from (18), for each munici-
pality j ∈ {c; si} we obtain:
F jL = wj + Λ
jj − u, (19)
recalling that the individual residing at locations −A, C and D pay no commuting costs. Con-
dition (19) characterizes the distribution of land between residents and ﬁrms in municipality
j.
3.4. Location system
The previous subsections described the behavior of individual households and ﬁrms. At the
metropolitan level, these decentralized behaviors entail a speciﬁc distribution of capital, res-
idents and workers among municipalities. This subsection characterizes this distribution by
deriving the so-called location system which is of particular importance to local governments.
29 Notice that assuming alternatively that τWj is paid directly by workers would lead to strictly identical results.
However, it is simpler from a modeling viewpoint, to introduce τWj in ﬁrms' proﬁt.
30 Suppose for instance that ﬁrms in town si bid more than residents at l = Ci, so that ψLsi > ψi (Ci). In this
case, some owners of residential land decide to supply their land to ﬁrms, business land increases in si and
ﬁrms bid less for land (since F siLL < 0) until ψ
L
si = ψi (Ci).
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Since the return to capital r is the same throughout the MA, r can be eliminated from the
condition for capital input demand (16) so that:
F cK − τKc = F siK − τKsi (e.4)
Conditions (e.1) and (e.4) characterize the distribution of capital {Kc;Ks1 ; . . . ;Ksn} in the
MA. Similarly, the same utility level u prevails throughout the MA, so that u can be eliminated
from the marginal renter condition (19):
F cW − τWc − F cL + U c + U cc − τRc = F siW − τWsi − F siL + U si + U sisi − τRsi (e.5)
where the deﬁnition of Λjj and the optimal condition for labor and land input demand, (15) and
(17), have been inserted. Conditions (e.2) and (e.5) characterize the distribution of residents
{Rc;Rs1 ; . . . ;Rsn} in the MA. The marginal worker condition (13) can be written explicitly
as:
F cW − τWc + U sic − T (B,−A) = F siW − τWsi + U sisi − T (B, C), (e.6)
using the expression for the indirect utility (11) and replacing the wages from the optimal
condition for labor input demand (15). Conditions (e.3) and (e.6) characterize the distribution
of labor {Wc;Ws1 ; . . . ;Wsn} in the MA.
In sum, the (3n + 3)-equation location system (e.1)(e.6)  in which Lj , j ∈ {c; si}
has been substituted in the production function using (2)  implicitly deﬁnes the 3n + 3
variables {Kj ;Rj ;Wj}j∈{c;si} as a function of the local governments' policy instruments
{Gj ; τKj ; τRj ; τWj ; τLj }j∈{c;si}. As will be seen in the next section, the location pattern charac-
terized by system (e.1)(e.6) is the main driving force behind municipality's policies.
4. Decentralized policies
Pareto eﬃciency is characterized in the online appendix . In this section, we characterize
decentralized local public policies chosen by municipalities when local labor taxation/subsidy
is allowed (subsection 4.1) and when it is proscribed (subsection 4.2). Since all towns si are
identical, we drop index i in the remainder of the paper.
4.1. Optimal local public policies with labor taxes/subsidies: First-best
This subsection considers the case where local labor taxes/subsidies τWj , j ∈ {c; s} are available
so that each local government j ∈ {c; s} ﬁnances its local public good provision Gj by levying
a head tax on its residents τRj , a unit tax on capital τ
K
j , a unit tax on labor τ
W
j and a unit
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tax on land property τLj . Local government j's budget constraint is:
τRj Rj + τ
K
j Kj + τ
W
j Wj + τ
L
j Lj = Cj , (20)
where Cj ≡ Cj(Gj) is the increasing cost function of public good provision, so that
Cj′(Gj) ≡ CjG > 0.31 Municipality j chooses freely τRj , τKj , τWj and Gj , and adjusts the
land tax τLj to clear its local budget constraint (20).
32 Local government j maximizes the
utility of its residents. Residential mobility in j implies that all residents of j have the same
equilibrium utility level. Then, government j's objective is reduced to maximizing the utility
of a representative resident, say the resident living the closest to municipality j's business
district that is, at l = −A for the city and at l = C or l = D for a town.
When making its policy choices, government j considers as given the choices of the other
governments. Additionally, government j does not directly control for the location of capital,
residents and workers, but it rationally takes into account their location responses to its
policies. Due to their size diﬀerence (Assumption 1) city and towns do not account for the
same set of location responses.
Since town s is atomistic , it regards its decisions as having no eﬀect on the variables in the
city and the other towns. It accounts for the fact that its population Rs, workforce Ws and
capital Ks are deﬁned implicitly as functions of its policy instruments {τRs ; τKs ; τWs ;Gs} by
the location system (e.4), (e.5) and (e.6). Therefore, government s's problem is to maximize
V ss(C), choosing τRs , τKs , τWs and Gs, and subject to the location system (e.4)(e.6). Unlike
the towns, the size of the city is signiﬁcant; the city accounts for the responses of all economic
agents in the MA to its policy decisions. It accounts for the fact that the city's and the
towns' population (Rc and Rs), workforce (Wc and Ws) and capital (Kc and Ks) are deﬁned
implicitly as functions of its policy instruments {τRc ; τKc ; τWc ;Gc} by the location system (e.1)
(e.6). Government c's problem therefore, is to maximize V cc(−A), choosing τRc , τKc , τWc and
Gc, subject to the full location system (e.1)(e.6).
Solving the municipalities' maximization problems, the following result can be derived:
Result 1. The optimal public policy rules followed by the benevolent local government of
municipality j ∈ {c; s} when ﬁnancing its public good provision Gj using the tax instrument
31 For simplicity, we consider nonrival public goods, while most empirical studies ﬁnd evidence of rivalry (e.g.
Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). See Ly (2018b) for a version of the model with this rival public goods; the
results are in line with those in this paper.
32 Formally, τLj is eliminated from the net land income Γ using (20) in the remainder of the paper (see Appendix
A.2). Note that whatever the other instrument (i.e. τRj , τ
K
j , τ
W
j or Gj) the modeler chooses to account for
budget constraint (20), the results would be unchanged: τLj would still be used indirectly as the budget-
clearing instrument by municipalities since Lj is ﬁx, contrary to Rj , Kj , Wj .
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set {τRj ; τKj ; τWj ; τLj } are:
τWs = −Φ, (21a)
τRs = t
Ws
2
+ a
(
Ws
2
)2
+ Φ, (22a)
τKs = 0, (23a)
RsU
s
G +WsU
ss
G = C
s
G, (24a)
τWc = 0, (21b)
τRc = t
Wc
n
+ a
(
Wc
n
)2
, (22b)
τKc = 0, (23b)
Rc(U
c
G + U
cc
G ) + nWscU
sc
G = C
c
G, (24b)
where τLj , j ∈ {c; s} allows to clear the budget constraint (20). And:
Φ ≡ a
2
[(
Wc
n
)2
−
(
Ws
2
)2]
> 0. (25)
whose positive sign stems from Assumption 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Result 1 implies that:
Corollary 1. The decentralized equilibrium levels of τRc −τRs , τKc −τKs , Rs, Ks and Ws, when
the local tax instrument set is {τWj ; τRj ; τKj ; τLj }, j ∈ {c; s} are characterized by:
τWc − τWs = Φ (26)
τRc − τRs = t
(
Wc
n
− Ws
2
)
+ Φ (27)
τKc − τKs = 0 (28)
xcc + F
c
L = xsc + F
s
L (29)
F cK = F
s
K (30)
F cW − xsc − t
Wc
n
− a
(
Wc
n
)2
= F sW − xss − t
Ws
2
− a
(
Ws
2
)2
. (31)
and Rc, Kc and Wc are deﬁned by the constraints (e.1)(e.3).
Proof. See the online appendix .
Corollary 1 reveals that municipalities choose their policy instruments in accordance with
a central planner's eﬃciency rules.33 Competing local governments which can ﬁnance local
33 Conditions (24a), (24b) and (26)(31) are strictly equivalent to the eﬃciency conditions (oa.5)(oa.12)
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public goods Gj using the tax instrument set {τRj ; τKj ; τWj ; τLj } are provided indirectly with
incentives to implement the eﬃcient allocation of resources in the MA.
? Labor taxation. Conditions (21a) and (21b) characterize the setting of local labor taxes.
Condition (21a) indicates that town s uses its labor tax as a subsidy. The rationale behind
this central result is as follows. Given the population Rs, an additional worker in the SBD of s
is a resident of s who initially was commuting to the CBD. This can be depicted as a one unit
shift of point Bi towards 0 in Figure 1. Then, the total traﬃc congestion cost decreases 
by 0.5a(Wc/n)
2  in the city, and increases  by 0.5a(Ws/2)
2  in a town. Assumption 2,
implies that due to the high concentration of workers in the CBD (Wc/n > Ws/2), the
additional worker in the SBD of s reduces the net traﬃc congestion cost incurred by the
residents of s. This gain is internalized by government s by a labor subsidy as stated in (21a).
Intuitively, condition (21a) means that since traﬃc congestion is higher in the city than in
the suburbs, the town governments subsidize their workers to prevent to many from commuting
to the CBD. Importantly, if there were no traﬃc congestion (a = 0), towns would have no
incentive to use the labor subsidy (i.e. τWs = 0, since Φ = 0). Traﬃc congestion requires that
the towns' tax instrument sets include local labor taxes to achieve a Pareto eﬃcient allocation
of labor in the MA.
According to condition (21b), the city does not use its labor tax. This indicates that the
eﬀorts made by the self-interested atomistic towns to retain their workers are suﬃcient to
ensure an optimal level of traﬃc congestion in the city.
? Residential taxation. Conditions (22a) and (22b) characterize the residential taxation
rules. Condition (22b) indicates that the ﬁscal beneﬁt τRc of a new resident in c covers the
additional cost of commuting to the CBD induced by this new resident: tWc/n + a(Wc/n)
2.
By crowding out one unit of business land (shift of −A towards Lc/n in Figure 1), the new
resident increases the overall distance to the CBD by Wc/n.
34 This implies an additional
commuting cost of tWc/n due to distance and a(Wc/n)
2 due to traﬃc congestion.
Intuitively, a new resident in c makes the CBD less accessible by increasing the cost of
commuting to work in c. In order to safeguard an optimal level of access to the CBD, local
government c uses its residential tax τRc to control its population size.
35
characterized in the online appendix . The economic interpretations of conditions (26)(31) can be found
in the online appendix .
34 Each of the Wc/n CBD workers located on the strip on which the new resident settles incurs one more space
unit of commuting.
35 Notice that if commuting is not costly that is t = a = 0, local governments do not use their tax on residents.
In this case, local authorities know that workers are perfectly mobile so that a jurisdiction's population and
workforce are not connected directly. τR cannot be used to control access to the business district.
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Like condition (22b), condition (22a) indicates that the residential tax τRs internalizes
the additional congestion cost induced by a new resident: tWs/2 + a(Ws/2)
2. Indeed, a
new resident living and working in s crowds out one unit of business land and increases
the commuting distance to the SBD of s by Ws/2 space units which generates the additional
commuting costs mentioned above.36,37 Compared to the city, an additional cost is internalized
by the residential tax in town s. This cost is the subsidy −τWs = Φ oﬀered to the new resident-
worker settling in s, according to condition (21a).
? Capital taxation. Conditions (23a) and (23b) which characterize the capital taxation
rules, state, as standard, that municipalities have no incentive to tax capital. Capital entails
no externality to be internalized.
? Public good provision. Conditions (24a) and (24b) characterize the public good pro-
vision rules. They are Samuelson eﬃciency rules extended to an economy in which mobile
workers also beneﬁt from local public goods. They state that municipality j ∈ {c; s} chooses
its public good provision Gj so as to equalize the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for
its public good to the marginal cost of providing the public good, CjG.
Condition (24a) indicates that town s accounts for the satisfaction of all its residents RsU
s
G
and especially its residents-workers WsU
ss
G . Interestingly, condition (24b) reveals that the city
not only accounts for the beneﬁts of its own residents Rc(U
c
G + U
cc
G ) but also internalizes the
public good spillovers induced by workers' mobility from the suburb to the city nWscU
sc
G .
38
The main result of this subsection can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If local labor taxation/subsidy is allowed, a decentralized equilibrium leads to
Pareto-eﬃciency, and:
(i) towns subsidize labor to internalize the traﬃc jam cost diﬀerential with the city.
(ii) residential taxation guarantees optimal access to business districts.
(iii) capital taxation is not used.
(iv) public good provision follows the Samuelson rule extended to commuting spillover.
36 We assume in this interpretation that the new resident works in the SBD. We could also transform (22a)
using (e.6) to describe the case of a new resident commuting to the CBD. The resulting condition is less
easy to interpret even if the same forces are at stake.
37 Contrary to τRj , τ
W
j does not internalize the commuting cost due to distance tW
+
j , where W
+
j is as deﬁned
in (7). The reason for this is that given the number of workers, new residents increase the overall commuting
distance in j by crowding out business land. However, given the number of residents, new workers do not
aﬀect the overall commuting distance in j.
38 This result echoes Tiebout's (1956) result. Here, residential mobility forces the city to account for all
household welfare when providing its public good. Wellisch (1993) derives a similar results in a regional tax
competition model.
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Proposition 1 presents an original picture of local government behavior compared to the LPE
literature which is further discussed in section 6.
4.2. Optimal local public policies absent labor taxes/subsidies
The above analysis assumes that the local tax instrument set includes labor taxation/subsidy.
Therefore, towns are able to internalize traﬃc congestion by using labor subsidies as a Pigou-
vian policy instrument. However, in OECD countries labor subsidies are rarely available at the
local level (section 1). We now consider the more common case where municipalities have no
access to local labor taxes/subsidies. Solving the same municipality maximization problems
as in subsection 4.1, with τWj = 0, the following result can be derived:
Result 2. The optimal public policy rules followed by the benevolent local government of
municipality j ∈ {c; s} when ﬁnancing its public good provision Gj using the tax instrument
set {τRj ; τKj ; τLj } are:
τRs = t
Ws
2
+ a
(
Ws
2
)2
+ Φ + dRs , (32a)
τKs = −dKs , (33a)
RsU
s
G +WsU
ss
G = C
s
G − dGs , (34a)
τRc = t
Wc
n
+ a
(
Wc
n
)2
+ dRs − dRc (32b)
τKc = −dKs + dKc (33b)
Rc(U
c
G + U
cc
G ) + nWscU
sc
G = C
c
G + d
G
c (34b)
and τLj clears the budget constraint (20) with τ
W
j = 0. The distortion terms are deﬁned as:
39
dRs ≡ (F sWL − t− aWc/n)
Φ
Ds
, dKs ≡ F sWK
Φ
Ds
> 0, dGs ≡ UssG
Φ
Ds
> 0,
dRc ≡ (nF cWL + F sWL)
Φ
Dc
> 0, dKc ≡ (nF cWK + F sWK)
Φ
Dc
> 0, dGc ≡ nUscG
Φ
Dc
> 0,
where Φ is deﬁned in (25) and Φ > 0 under Assumption 2, and:
Ds ≡ 3
2
t+ a
(
Wc
n
+
Ws
4
)
− F sWW > 0, Dc ≡ Ds − nF cWW > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Result 2 implies that:
39 The signs are obtained recalling that Φ ≥ 0, FXX < 0 and FXY > 0 for all X,Y ∈ {K;W ;L}.
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Corollary 2. The decentralized equilibrium levels of τRc −τRs , τKc −τKs , Rs, Ks and Ws, when
the local tax instrument set is {τRj ; τKj ; τLj }, j ∈ {c; s} are characterized by:
τRc − τRs = t
(
Wc
n
− Ws
2
)
+ Φ + dRc (35)
τKc − τKs = dKc (36)
xcc + F
c
L + d
R
c = xsc + F
s
L (37)
F cK − dKc = F sK (38)
F cW − xsc − t
Wc
n
− a
(
Wc
n
)2
+ Φ = F sW − xss − t
Ws
2
− a
(
Ws
2
)2
. (39)
and Rc, Kc and Wc are deﬁned by the constraints (e.1)(e.3).
Proof. See the online appendix .
Comparing Corollary 2 to the Pareto-eﬃcient outcome of Corollary 1 shows that municipality
behaviors are distorted in a sub-eﬃcient way, as shown by the distortion terms dxj , j = {c; s}
and x ∈ {R;K;G}.40 The only cause of these distortions is the impossibility for towns to
regulate traﬃc congestion using labor subsidies.41 Since towns cannot subsidize workers, there
are too many workers in the city and too few in the suburbs. This labor misallocation can
be seen in the presence of Φ > 0 in condition (39) which was absent from eﬃciency condition
(31). Then, town (resp. city) authorities distort their remaining instruments {τRj ; τKj ;Gj} to
be more (resp. less) attractive to workers.
? Residential taxation. Condition (32a) depicts how town s distorts its tax on residents to
overcome the absence of labor tax. The sign of the distortion dRs is ambiguous. To understand
this, consider two polar cases.
First, suppose that t > 0, a > 0 and F sWL ≈ 0. Then, dRs < 0 that is, the towns under-tax
their residents compared to (22a). Imperfect worker mobility (i.e. costly commuting) spurs
the towns to set a low residential tax to attract residents-workers and hence alleviate the traﬃc
congestion incurred by their residents working in the CBD.
Second, suppose that t ≈ 0, a ≈ 0 and F sWL > 0. Then, dRs > 0 that is, the towns over-
tax their residents. Local authorities know that population and workforce are not linked by
imperfect worker mobility since commuting is not costly. However, they can attract workers
by increasing the amount of land available to ﬁrms. Indeed, technological complementarity
40 See Figure OA.1 in the online appendix for an illustration of the misallocation implied by conditions (34a),
(34b), and (37)(39).
41 Were there no traﬃc congestion, local governments would not distort their policy instruments. Indeed, a = 0
implies dxj = 0, so that Result 2 and Corollary 2 become Result 1 and Corollary 1.
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F sWL > 0 implies that more business land increases local wage and attracts workers. To
increase the land size of their SBD, the towns over-tax residents to reduce their population
and make room for business land.
The above two polar cases show that towns can under-tax or over-tax their residents,
depending on the relative importance of commuting costs and technological complementarity
between labor and business land.
Condition (32b), which characterizes the city's residential tax policy, can be better in-
terpreted by considering condition (35) in which dRs is eliminated using (32a).
42 Comparing
condition (35) to the ﬁrst-best condition (27), indicates that given the towns' residential tax
rate, the city chooses an ineﬃciently low residential tax rate, since −dRc < 0.
This too low residential tax is a response to the excessive number of workers inducing
traﬃc congestion in the city (condition (39)). The city cuts its residential tax to attract
new residents, which limits the land size of the CBD and thus avoids some commuting ﬂows.
However, this attractive city residential tax policy entails a misallocation of residents in the
MA. Condition (37) shows that the number of residents in the city (resp. towns) is ineﬃciently
high (resp. low) compared to the Pareto-eﬃcient condition (29).
? Capital taxation. Condition (33a), shows that the towns now subsidize capital, since
−dKs < 0. Compared to the ﬁrst-best condition (23a), the towns now under-tax capital.
Since they cannot subsidize labor, they subsidize capital to attract workers, exploiting the
technological complementarity between capital and labor (F sWK > 0).
Condition (33b) indicates that the speciﬁc distortion of the city's capital tax is positive,
dKc > 0. This distortion can be better understood by comparing (36) to the ﬁrst-best condition
(28).43 Condition (36) shows that the city chooses an ineﬃciently high capital tax rate, given
the towns' capital tax rate, since dKc > 0.
In response to the excessive number of costly workers in the CBD, the city authorities
exploit the technological complementarity between capital and labor, by increasing their cap-
ital tax. By doing so, they discourage capital, and thus indirectly discourage workers from
locating in the city. Condition (38) shows that the amount of capital in the city (resp. towns)
is ineﬃciently low (resp. high) compared to the Pareto-eﬃcient condition (30).
42 Notice that the city's residential tax τRc internalizes the distortion of the towns d
R
s , as can be seen in (32b).
This is because residents' mobility links the welfare of city residents to the welfare of suburbanites; all
households have the same level of utility at equilibrium.
43 The city's capital tax τKc internalizes the distortion of the towns d
K
s . The reason is the same as for τ
R
c . See
footnote 42.
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? Public good provision. Condition (34a) shows that, since the towns cannot subsidize
labor, the towns over-provide public goods compared to the eﬃcient extended Samuelson
rule (24a), since −dGs < 0. By increasing their public good provision, the towns are able to
encourage more workers to work in their SBD, since U ssG > 0.
Condition (34b) indicates that the city behaves in an opposite way by providing an in-
eﬃciently low amount of public good, since dGc > 0. Since towns cannot keep a suﬃcient
number of workers, the city controls traﬃc congestion by decreasing its public good supply
which discourages some suburbanites from commuting to the CBD, since U scG > 0.
The distortions in the local policy setting caused by the existence of traﬃc jams in the
MA are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If towns are not allowed to subsidize workers, a decentralized equilibrium
does not lead to Pareto-eﬃciency, and under Assumption 2:
(i) the city under-taxes residents compared to the towns.
(ii) the city over-taxes capital compared to the towns.
(iii) the city (resp. towns) under-provides (resp. over-provide) local public goods.
Proposition 2, which shows the eﬀects of traﬃc congestion on local public policy in a MA,
is novel in the literature. The main new insight is the following. If the city concentrates an
important share of the workforce of the MA (Assumption 2), the impossibility for towns to
retain workers by employing subsidies entails an overﬂow of workers in the CBD. To prevent
excess traﬃc congestion incurred by households working in the CBD, city and towns engage
in ineﬃcient policies. Notably, part (iii) indicates that local governments distort their public
good provision accounting for local public good spillovers induced by commuting. The city
(resp. towns) reduces (resp. increase) its (resp. their) public good provision to be less (resp.
more) attractive to workers. To our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst to consider commuting
spillovers and to depict how they can induce distortion in local governments' choices.
We have seen also that the distortions in the local policy setting induced by the excessive
level of traﬃc congestion in the city relative to the towns (i.e. too many workers in the city)
lead to a misallocation of residents and capital in the MA. This is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. If towns are not allowed to subsidize workers, under Assumption 2, a
decentralized equilibrium leads to:
(i) an ineﬃciently high number of workers in the city, compared to the towns.
(ii) an ineﬃciently high number of residents in the city, compared to the towns.
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(iii) an ineﬃciently low amount of capital in the city, compared to the towns.
5. Numerical example
To gain general equilibrium insights into the results of section 4, this section provides a nu-
merical illustration. The purpose is to shed a light on the distortions caused by various traﬃc
jam intensities a. To this end, we assume that the cost function of public good provision is
Cj(G) = G2, that the utility function is xj +U
j(Gj) +U
jj′(Gj′) = xj +G
γ
j +G

j′ and that the
production is carried out by the Cobb-Douglas function F j(Wj ,Kj , Lj) = AjK
α
j W
β
j L
1−α−β
j .
44
(a) Capital tax rate gap. (b) Resident tax rate gap.
empty
(c) Public good in the city. (d) Public good in town s.
empty
(e) Capital in the city. (f) Residents in the city. (g) Workers in the city.
Figure 2. Distortions with respect to traﬃc jam intensity a. For each variableX, ∆X ≡ X??−X?
where X? is the ﬁrst-best (Pareto-eﬃcient) equilibrium value of X resulting from Result 1, and X??
is its second-best equilibrium value resulting from Result 2.
Figure 2 reports the simulation results which depict the distortions of the key variables of
the model as a function of traﬃc jam intensity a. The distortions ∆X withX ∈ {τKc −τKs ; τRc −
44 The parameter values for the simulations are: number of towns, n = 650; municipalities' land endowments,
Lc = 10000 and Ls = 300; MA's capital endowment and population, K = 3000 and P = 5500; elasticity of
output w.r.t. capital and labor, α = 0.55 and β = 0.2; elasticity of utility w.r.t. public good consumption
at home and at work γ = 0.95 and  = 0.01; municipalities' productivity parameter Ac = 3 and As = 1.5.
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τRs ;Gc;Gs;Kc;Rc;Wc}45 are measured as the diﬀerence between the equilibrium value of X
without local labor subsidies (Result 2 and Corollary 2) and the Pareto-eﬃcient level of X
(Result 1 and Corollary 1).
The numeric results in Figure 2 are in line with Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. The
simulations conﬁrm that without traﬃc congestion a = 0, Pareto-eﬃciency is achieved in
the decentralized equilibrium without labor subsidy: ∆X = 0 for all variables. Figure 2g
indicates that an excessive number of workers in the CBD (∆Wc > 0) arises when there is
traﬃc congestion (a > 0), and that this excess of workers gets worse as traﬃc congestion
intensiﬁes (a increases). Figures 2a2d show how municipalities respond to the overcrowded
CBD by increasingly distorting their policy instrument setting as a increases.
First, Figure 2a indicates that the city sets a too high capital tax relative to the towns
(∆(τKc − τKs ) > 0). This strategy allows the city to reduce the size of the CBD by exerting
excessive outﬂows of capital towards the towns, as illustrated by Figure 2e (∆Kc < 0).
Second, Figure 2b highlights another way to cut the size of the CBD. The city sets an
ineﬃciently low tax on residents compared to the towns (∆(τRc − τRs ) < 0). This allows the
city to attract a higher number of residents as suggested by Figure 2f (∆Rc > 0), and to crowd
out business land.
Finally, public good spillovers due to commuting allow municipalities to directly aﬀect
the workers ﬂow. According to Figure 2c, to reduce its attractiveness to workers the city
provides an ineﬃciently low amount of public good (∆Gc < 0). However, Figure 2d shows
that since towns want to retain their workers, they do the opposite and over-provide public
goods (∆Gs > 0).
6. Discussion
The model developed in this paper sheds new light on several important and often longstanding
LPE debates. This section discusses some of them. Subsection 6.1 highlights the original role
played by residential taxation in MAs. Subsection 6.2 questions the standard result that cities
charge higher tax rates than towns. Subsection 6.3 discusses how household mobility calls for
a reconsideration of externalities at the local level. Subsection 6.4 outlines that labor taxation
should not be regarded as a second-class policy in MAs.
45 For space reasons, we do not report the graphs for ∆Ks = −∆Kc/n, ∆Rs = −∆Rc/n and ∆Ws = −∆Wc/n
which are symmetric to ∆Kc, ∆Rc and ∆Wc with respect to the x-axis.
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6.1. A new role for the residential tax: job accessibility
The paper sheds new light on the role of local residential taxes. In the literature, the essential
motive for taxing mobile residents is to internalize crowding costs induced by their consumption
of a rival local public good. This role has been conﬁrmed for most types of residence based
taxes such as head taxes (Wildasin, 1980, 1986), housing taxes (Hoyt, 1991; Krelove, 1993) and
wage taxes (Wilson, 1995).46 In all these cases, without crowding costs, local governments do
not tax their residents if they can ﬁnance public goods via another undistortive tax instrument.
In this paper, despite the nonrivalry of local public goods and the availability of an undis-
tortive tax on land, municipalities use residential taxes  even without traﬃc congestion 
to control access to their business district:47 they raise their residential tax to discourage too
many residents-workers from choosing their business district as a workplace. To our knowledge,
the link between residential taxes and job accessibility has not previously been demonstrated.
6.2. Who sets the highest tax rate in the MA?
The paper also provides new insights into the longstanding question about which, city or
towns, sets the highest taxes on capital and residents in a MA? The traditional tax competition
literature is unambiguous: the city charges higher tax rates than the towns on both capital
(Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 2009) and residents (Epple and Zelenitz, 1981;
Hoyt, 1992).48 The basic reason for this is that due to its larger population, a city has more
inﬂuence on capital and housing prices than towns do, and therefore, can set higher tax rates
on capital and housing.
These results have been conﬁrmed by several theoretical contributions, especially for capital
taxation. According to the new economic geography literature (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman,
2004), agglomeration economies lock mobile capital into the largest jurisdictions which beneﬁt
from this agglomeration rent and can levy a high capital tax rate on this quasi-ﬁxed tax
base.49 In a two-jurisdiction tax competition model with commuting, Kächelein (2014) shows
that due to the limited geographic mobility of labor, the more populated jurisdiction sets a
higher capital tax rate. Gaigné et al. (2016, p.108) ﬁnd that the central city sets a higher
46 The distortions arising when a residence-based tax is not available and local public goods are rivals are
studied in Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000).
47 Formally, this can be seen by assuming that a = 0 and t > 0 in (22a) and (22b).
48 See Wilson (1999) and Brülhart et al. (2015) for surveys of the literature on asymmetric tax competition.
49 Empirical evidence of the existence of taxable agglomeration rents is less clear. While Charlot and Paty
(2007) for example provide results supporting this ﬁnding for French municipalities, Luthi and Schmidheiny
(2013) using panel data of Swiss municipalities ﬁnd no evidence of a positive impact of agglomeration forces
on capital tax rates.
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business tax rate than suburban municipalities, due to the central position of the CBD in the
transportation network (see subsection 6.4 below).50
Yet, the theoretical consensus stating that cities tax more heavily than towns does not
always coincide with basic empirical facts. For instance, in 2009 among the ten most populated
French MAs, 54% of suburban towns set a higher tax rate on capital than the rate set by the
city in their MA, and 41% of towns set a higher housing tax rate (Ly, 2018b).51
This paper provides some insights which help to explain these observations. The model
shows that whether the city or the towns set higher tax rates on capital and residents depends
on the concentration of workers in the city.52 If the city concentrates a low share of the MA
workforce, the city sets lower tax rates than the towns on both capital and residents. In other
words, in MAs where jobs are not overly concentrated in the city, we should observe a more
signiﬁcant number of towns setting higher taxes on capital and residents than the city. The
intuition is as follows. If the towns accounts for a high share of the workforce, then (i) the
city taxes its capital less than the towns to reduce traﬃc congestion in the suburbs, and (ii)
the city taxes its residents less than the towns to guarantee a suﬃcient level of access to jobs
in SBDs.
6.3. Externalities and household mobility
Frequently, inter-jurisdictional externalities are considered as the main source of ineﬃciencies
in a context of decentralized government activities. A local government, by accounting ex-
clusively for the welfare of its own residents, ignores the beneﬁts/costs of its policy choices
for non-residents, and thus implements ineﬃcient policies. This conclusion is based on the
assumption of immobile residents which is not satisfactory in the case of sub-metropolitan ju-
risdictions such as municipalities. Residents' inter-jurisdictional mobility forces local govern-
ments to account for the welfare of non-residents such that at the local level, inter-jurisdictional
externalities are minor. Our paper reveals that an important source of ineﬃciencies in MAs
is the inter-individual externality of traﬃc congestion. This involves distortions which can
50 A notable exception is Janeba and Osterloh (2013) where cities compete not only with the towns of their
MA but also with cities in other MAs, while towns compete only with the municipalities in their particular
MA. When the number of MAs is suﬃciently large, the competition faced by a city is so high compared to
that faced by the towns in its MA that the city sets a lower capital tax rate than that set by the towns.
51 These mitigated results are noted by Brülhart et al. (2015, p. 1151): empirical estimates provide conﬂicting
evidence for the eﬀect of population size on jurisdictions' tax rates.
52 Formally, τRc ≷ τRs and τKc ≷ τKs if Wc ≷ P/3. That is, the ordering of the tax rates depends on whether
Assumption 2 holds or not. Proof. Algebraic manipulations show that condition (35) can be written as:
τRc −τRs = t
(
Wc
n
− Ws
2
)
+ Φ
Dc
(
3t
2
+ a
(
Wc
n
+ Ws
4
))
, so that sign(τRc −τRs ) = sign(Wc/n−Ws/2) = sign(Wc−
P/3). From condition (36), we directly have sign(τKc − τKs ) = sign(Wc − P/3).
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work in the opposite direction to distortions induced by inter-jurisdictional externalities. This
applies particularly to two types of externality.
The ﬁrst is the ﬁscal externality induced by capital mobility. The standard tax competition
result is that capital inter-jurisdictional mobility spurs local governments to set ineﬃciently
low taxes on capital (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). This ineﬃciency is due to
a positive inter-jurisdictional externality: jurisdictions overlook the fact that increasing their
own taxes will beneﬁt other jurisdictions receiving capital inﬂows (Wildasin, 1989). Residen-
tial mobility eliminates this externality since tax competition does not matter in the case
of household mobility, since each region considers the welfare of nonresidents by taking the
migration equilibrium into account (Wellisch, 2006, p. 115). The present paper newly shows
that the distortion threat in a MA with capital and household mobility is over-taxation of
capital by the city which is aimed at preventing excessive traﬃc congestion in the CBD.
The second externality is the public good spillover or its consumption by non-residents. A
well-known result is that these spillover eﬀects drive jurisdictions to under-provide local public
goods, since in decentralized decision-making, the value of local public services to nonresi-
dents is ignored (Gordon, 1983, p. 578). This result also relies on the assumption of immobile
residents. As shown in Wellisch (1993), relaxing this assumption leads to eﬃcient local public
good provision, since local governments consider the welfare of mobile non-residents. Our
analysis shows that despite residents' mobility, local public good spillovers lead local govern-
ments to distort their public good provision in order to prevent excessive traﬃc congestion.
However, under-provision occurs only in the city; towns over-provide public goods.
6.4. Local labor tax/subsidy: a ﬁrst-class policy instrument
This paper shows that labor taxation/subsidy is a ﬁrst-best tax instrument. However, most
work on tax competition with commuting and source-based taxation on labor considers it, a
second-best instrument. In this literature, two main reasons explain why local governments
make use of a labor tax/subsidy.
First, a labor tax might be imposed for budgetary reasons in the unavailability of any other
tax relying on a less mobile tax base. This requires that labor mobility is limited, usually by
commuting costs.53 For example, in a model with symmetric jurisdictions, Braid (2000) shows
that if local public goods are ﬁnanced by a labor tax and a capital tax, only the former is
imposed in the presence of commuting costs.54 In a model with a city and towns, Gaigné et al.
53 An exception is Braid (1996) in which labor limited mobility results from the ﬁxity of business land.
54 If commuting costs decrease the labor tax also decreases, until commuting costs reach zero when labor is no
longer taxed and no public goods are provided. See proposition 3 and 4 in Braid (2000).
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(2016) ﬁnd a related result which shows that the city exploits labor limited mobility induced
by commuting costs to impose a positive business tax, while towns set a zero tax.55 The link
between labor taxation and commuting costs is however broken if a less distortive tax allows
the ﬁnancing of the public good.56
Second, a labor tax/subsidy can be used also for tax exporting purposes that is, shifting
the tax burden to nonresidents. This case is illustrated in Peralta (2007) which shows that
the labor importer jurisdiction taxes labor while the labor exporter subsidizes it.57 For tax
exporting also, local governments prefer an undistortive instrument such as a land tax to a
distortive tax on labor.
In the present paper, the availability of an undistortive tax on land allows for both local
budget balancing and tax exporting. Towns subsidize labor for a diﬀerent reason  that of
internalizing traﬃc congestion costs. This can be considered the ﬁrst-best or natural role of
local labor taxation/subsidy in a MA.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates how local governments such as municipalities address one of the biggest
MA challenges: traﬃc congestion. Traﬃc congestion is a typical MA negative externality,
similar to air, waste and noise pollutions, which results from the spatial agglomeration of jobs
and household mobility. It is also considered a major problem by policy makers and economists
due to its signiﬁcant costs (e.g. fuel, working time wasted, stress, maintenance of congested
roads, greenhouse gas emissions).
The study develops a new urban tax competition model which links local public economics
and urban economics models. The analysis shows that common local ﬁscal instruments may
be used by municipalities to curb overwhelming traﬃc congestion in MA centers. Speciﬁcally,
by charging high capital tax rates and low residential tax rates, the central city can make its
business district less attractive to workers which reduces traﬃc congestion. Since many public
goods (e.g. safety, public hygiene and roads) are consumed not only by the municipality's
residents but also by its workers, local public good provision can also be employed. To free up
the MA's roads, the central city and the suburban towns respectively can reduce and increase
their public good provision. The aforementioned instruments are however only second-best
55 See proposition 2 in Gaigné et al. (2016). Notice that Gaigné et al. consider a poll tax on ﬁrms. However,
since labor is the only input, the economic incidence of this tax is essentially similar to that of a labor tax.
56 This is shown in proposition 2 in Braid (2000) which indicates that if a tax on immobile residents is available,
labor taxation is no longer applied.
57 See proposition 2 in Peralta (2007). Also, see Gordon (1983) for a similar early tax exporting result in a
model with residents' mobility.
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tools; the paper shows that the most eﬃcient way to regulate traﬃc congestion is to allow
suburban towns to provide ﬁrms with local labor subsidies.
Decentralized local labor subsidies could proﬁtably complement national (e.g. lane tolls,
gasoline taxes) and regional (e.g. integrated public transport) solutions. These solutions
often receive poor public support.58 Local labor subsidies would be more acceptable; unlike
congestion charges, they are perceived as a rewarding rather than a punitive instrument.
Moreover, local governments are better informed than higher level authorities about their
residents' needs and can adapt their policies to their preferences. For instance, in a town
where voters complain hugely about time spent every day stuck in traﬃc jams, the local
mayor will be nudged to develop the town's business district through the provision of labor
subsidies.
In practice, local labor subsidies are critically missing, mainly because they are at odds
with competition policy. Subsidies are strictly controlled by supranational authorities such
as the European Commission, the World Trade Organization and the West African Economic
and Monetary Union (OECD, 2010).59 In view of the signiﬁcant market failures in MAs, these
local level restrictions would seem worthy of further consideration.
The easiest way to implement the subsidies recommended in this paper would be to let the
residents of each town vote on the level of monetary subsidy per worker, and to provide the
subsidy in the form of a tax credit to all local ﬁrms based on the number of their employees.
Notice that this ﬁscal instrument diﬀers from most existing local development subsidies and tax
credits, for instance in the US, that are often arbitrarily implemented by local governments and
are based on multiple performance criteria rather than focusing on the number of employees.60
An alternative solution is to subsidize workers rather than ﬁrms. For instance, town authorities
could provide local workers with direct monetary subsidies or in-kind advantages such as
luncheon vouchers, free parking places or public transport rebates.
The constantly growing economic signiﬁcance of MAs worldwide means that many impor-
tant challenges hitherto considered national will need to be rethought at the metropolitan
level. The paper contributes to this overall discussion by inviting national policy makers to re-
shape over-concentrated MAs to achieve greater polycentrism. They would proﬁtably provide
58 Congestion charges are unpopular with members of the public. This is exempliﬁed by the 2019 political crisis
in France involving the `Gilets jaunes' which was triggered by a rise in gasoline taxes. Also, public transport
solutions are not unanimously favored. EC (2013) surveyed 83 European municipalities and reports that
25% of individuals are not satisﬁed with their public transport  and this ﬁgure rose to 75%, 63% and 48%
respectively in Naples, Rome and Budapest.
59 All World Trade Organization members signed the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mechanisms
following the Uruguay Round in 1995.
60 See footnote 9 for more details about existing development subsidies.
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local authorities with more means to foster the development of strong secondary economic
poles.
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Appendix A Individual land income
According to the description made in section 3, the land income of an individual is:
Γ = P−1
n∑
i=1
[∫ 0
−Lc/n
[ρi(l)− τLc ]dl +
∫ Lsi
0
[ρi(l)− τLsi ]dl
]
(A.1)
The objective of this appendix is to derive the explicit expression of the individual land
income Γ in equilibrium. To this aim, we ﬁrst determine the equilibrium land rent function
(subsection A.1) from which we derive the equilibrium individual land income (subsection A.2).
A.1. Land rent function
In this subsection, we determine the land rent function in equilibrium: the land rent ρi(l) paid
by households or ﬁrms as a function of their location l on strip i. In business districts, the
land rent is equal to the business bid land rent characterized in (17), so that:
ρi(l) = F
c
L l ∈
]
−Lc
n
,−A
]
, (A.2)
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ρi(l) = F
si
L , l ∈ ]Ci,Di] . (A.3)
In residential land, the land rent is equal to residents' bid land rent characterized in (12), so
that:
ρi(l) = wc −
∫ l
−A
[t+ a(Bi − z)]dz + Λcc − u, l ∈ ]−A, 0] (A.4)
ρi(l) = wc −
∫ l
−A
[t+ a(Bi − z)]dz + Λsic − u, l ∈ ]0,Bi] , (A.5)
ρi(l) = wsi −
∫ Ci
l
[t+ a(z − Bi)]dz + Λsisi − u, l ∈ ]Bi, Ci] , (A.6)
ρi(l) = wsi −
∫ l
Di
[t+ a(Ls − z)]dz + Λsisi − u, l ∈ ]Di,Ls] . (A.7)
where T (l, l′) has been replaced by its the deﬁnition (7). A typical land rent function charac-
terized by (A.2)(A.7) is represented in Figure A.1.
−Lc
n
−A 0 Bi Ci Di Ls
ρi(l)
l
Figure A.1. Land rent function over a strip linking the city c to the town
si. Convexity of the land rent function (ie. concavity of the commuting
cost function) results from traﬃc congestion (a > 0): the closest the busi-
ness district, the less individuals suﬀer from the cumulative eﬀect of traﬃc
congestion on roads.
Using (19) and (e.6) to eliminate Λsisi , Λsisi and Λsisi , (A.4)(A.7) become:
ρi(l) = −
∫ l
−A
[t+ a(Bi − z)]dz + F cL, l ∈ ]−A, 0] (A.8)
ρi(l) =
∫ Bi
l
[t+ a(Bi − z)]dz −
∫ Ci
Bi
[t+ a(z − Bi)]dz + F siL , l ∈ ]0,Bi] , (A.9)
ρi(l) = −
∫ Ci
l
[t+ a(z − Bi)]dz + F siL , l ∈ ]Bi, Ci] (A.10)
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ρi(l) = −
∫ l
Di
[t+ a(Ls − z)]dz + F siL , l ∈ ]Di,Ls] (A.11)
A.2. Equilibrium land income
We can now derive the explicit form of the individual land income in equilibrium. To do so,
we need to insert (A.2)(A.2) and (A.8)(A.11) into (A.1) and collect terms, as described in
this subsection. Since land rent is constant within business districts and the land rent paid
by suburban residents working where they live is symmetric on both side of the SBD (see
Figure A.1), we have:∫ 0
−Lc
n
(
ρi(l)− τLc
)
dl =
∫ 0
−A
(
ρi(l)− τLc
)
dl + (F cL − τLc )
Lc
n∫ Ls
0
(
ρi(l)− τLsi
)
dl =
∫ Bi
0
(
ρi(l)− τLsi
)
dl + 2
∫ Ci
Bi
(
ρi(l)− τLsi
)
dl + (F siL − τLsi)Lsi
Then, from the aggregate land rent deﬁnition (A.1), we obtain:
Γ = P−1
n∑
i=1
[Ici + Isi + n−1(F cLLc − τLc Lc) + (F s1L Ls1 − τLs1Ls)] (A.12)
where
Ici ≡
∫ 0
−A
ρi(l)dl, Isi ≡
∫ Bi
0
ρi(l)dl + 2
∫ Ci
Bi
ρi(l)dl. (A.13)
Inserting (A.8)(A.10) into (A.13), replacing A, Bi and Ci by their deﬁnitions (3)(5), and
integrating, we obtain:
Ici =
t+ a(Rsi −Wsi)
2
(
Rc
n
)2
− a
3
(
Rc
n
)3
+ F cL
Rc
n
(A.14)
Isi =
aR3si
6
+
R2si (t− aWsi)
2
+
W 2si (6t− aWsi) + 3RsiWsi (aWsi − 4t)
8
+ F siL Rsi (A.15)
Then, replacing τLc and τLsi in (A.12) using the local budget constraints (20), and replacing Lc
and Lsi using the land occupation condition (2), we obtain:
Γ = P−1
n∑
i=1
[
Ici + Isi + F siL (Lsi −Rsi) + τRsiRsi + τKsi Ksi + τWsi Wsi − Csi
+ n−1(F cL(Lc −Rc) + τRc Rc + τKc Kc + τWc Wc − Cc)
]
, (A.16)
which is the explicit expression of the individual land income Γ in equilibrium, with Ici and
Isi deﬁned in (A.14) and (A.15).
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Since all towns are identical, the following appendices drop index i for convenience. How-
ever, notice that a given town's decision does not engage other towns.
Appendix B Proof of Result 1
The purpose of this section is to derive the municipalities' optimal policy rules when the tax
instrument set includes a tax/subsidy on labor. Speciﬁcally, we prove the towns' optimal
policy rules (21a)(24a) in subsection B.1 and the city's optimal policy rules (21b)(24b) in
subsection B.2. Before proceeding, recall that since F j is homogenous of degree 1, we have
the following Euler's formulas for each X ∈ {W ;K,L}:
F jWW + F
j
KK + F
j
LL = F
j , (A.17)
F jWXW + F
j
KXK + F
j
LXL = 0, (A.18)
As explained in subsection 3.4, the equilibrium level of Kc, Ks, Rc, Rs, Wc and Ws are fully
deﬁned by the equations (e.1)(e.6) which are restated here for convenience:
F cK − τKc − (F sK − τKs ) = 0 (A.19)
F cW − τWc + U sc −
∫ Rs−Ws
−Rc
n
[t+ a(Rs −Ws − z)] dz
−
(
F sW − τWs + U ss −
∫ Rs−Ws2
Rs−Ws
[t+ a(z −Rs +Ws)] dz
)
= 0 (A.20)
F cW − τWc − F cL + U c + U cc − τRc −
(
F sW − τWs − F sL + U s + U ss − τRs
)
= 0 (A.21)
P −Wc − nWs = 0 (A.22)
P −Rc − nRs = 0 (A.23)
K −Kc − nKs = 0 (A.24)
where (A.20) is obtained by replacing T (l, l′), A, B and C by their deﬁnitions (7) and (3)(5)
in (e.6).
B.1. Optimal policy rules of a town
In this subsection we prove the representative town's optimal policy rules (21a)(24a) when
labor taxation/subsidy is available. The utility of the resident of s living the closest from her
home town SBD is:
xs + U
s + U ss,
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and her budget constraint is:
xss + ρ(C) = ws + rk + Γ− τRs ,
with ρ(C) = F sL. Replacing ws using (15), it follows that the municipalities' program is to
maximize:
−F sL + F sW − τWs + rk + Γ + U s + U ss − τRs ,
choosing τRs , τ
K
s , Gs, Ws, Rs, Ks, subject to constraints (A.19), (A.20) and (A.21) to which
we respectively associate the Lagrange multipliers λ1, λ2 and λ3. The variables r, k and the
variables of the city Xc and those of the other towns Xsj are exogenous from the atomistic
representative town's viewpoint  especially, in the aggregate land rent Γ deﬁned in (A.16).
The business land Ls has been replaced into the production function using the land occupation
condition (2).
From the above program, we can derive the ﬁrst-order conditions. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to τRs , τ
K
s , τ
W
s and Gs are respectively:
Rs
P + λ3 − 1 = 0, (A.25)
Ks
P + λ1 = 0, (A.26)
Ws
P + λ2 + λ3 − 1 = 0, (A.27)
(1− λ3)U sG + (1− λ2 − λ3)U ssG −
CsG
P = 0. (A.28)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Rs is:
τRs
P +
t
P
(
Rs − 3Ws
2
− Pλ2
)
+
a
2P
[
R2s +
3W 2s
4
− R
2
c
n2
− 2RsWs +
(
Ws − Rc
n
−Rs
)
2Pλ2
]
−
(Ls
P + λ3 − 1
)
F sLL + λ1F
s
LK + (λ2 + λ3 − 1)F sLW = 0.
(A.29)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ks is:
τKs
P +
(Ls
P + λ3 − 1
)
F sKL − λ1F sKK − (λ2 + λ3 − 1)F sKW = 0. (A.30)
And, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ws is:
τWs
P −
3t
2P (Rs −Ws − λ2P) +
a
2P
[
R2c
n2
+
3RsWs
2
−R2s −
3W 2s
4
+
(
Rc
n
+Rs − 3
4
Ws
)
2λ2P
]
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+
(Ls
P + λ3 − 1
)
F sWL − λ1F sWK − (λ2 + λ3 − 1)F sWW = 0.
(A.31)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25)(A.27) entail:
λ3 − 1 = −RsP , λ1 = −
Ks
P , λ2 + λ3 − 1 = −
Ws
P , λ2 =
Rs −Ws
P (A.32)
Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and substituting Ls from (2), we have:(Ls
P + λ3 − 1
)
F sXL − λ1F sXK − (λ2 + λ3 − 1)F sXW = 0, X ∈ {K;W} (A.33)
And, from (e.2) and (e.3), we have:
Rc + nRs = Wc + nWs (A.34)
Inserting(A.32) and (A.33) into the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to public good provision
(A.28), population (A.29), capital (A.30) and labor (A.31), substituting Rc using (A.34) and
collecting terms implies:
RsU
s
G +WsU
ss
G − CsG = 0 (A.35)
τRs =
tWs
2
+
a
2
(
W 2c
n2
+
W 2s
4
)
(A.36)
τKs = 0 (A.37)
τWs =
a
2
(
W 2s
4
− W
2
c
n2
)
(A.38)
which proves conditions (22a)(24a) in Result 1.
B.2. Optimal policy rules of the city
In this subsection we prove the city's optimal policy rules (21b)(24b) when labor taxa-
tion/subsidy is available. Since the central municipality regards all towns as symmetric, the
aggregate land rent becomes:
Γ = P−1
[
n(Ic + Is + F sL(Ls −Rs) + τRs Rs + τKs Ks + τWs Ws − Cs)
+ F cL(Lc −Rc) + τRc Rc + τKc Kc + τWc Wc − Cc
]
,
The utility of the resident of c living the closest from the CBD is:
xcc + U
c + U cc,
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and her budget constraint is:
xcc + ρ(−A) = wc + rk + Γ− τRc .
with ρ(−A) = F cL. Replacing wc and r using (15) and (16), it follows that the municipalities'
program is to maximize:
−F cL + F cW − τWc +
(
F cK − τKc
)
k + Γ + U c + U cc − τRc ,
choosing τRc , τ
K
c , Gc, Gs,Wj , Rj , Kj , where j ∈ {c; s}i∈J1,nK, and subject to constraints (A.19),
(A.20), (A.21), (A.24), (A.22) and (A.23) to which we respectively associate the Lagrange
multipliers µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5 and µ6. Moreover, business land Lc and Ls have been replaced
into the production function using the land occupation condition (2).
From the above program, we can derive the ﬁrst-order conditions. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to τRc , τ
K
c , τ
W
c and Gc are respectively:
Rc
P − µ3 − 1 = 0 (A.39)
Kc
P − µ1 − k = 0 (A.40)
Wc
P − µ2 − µ3 − 1 = 0 (A.41)
(1 + µ3) (U
c
G + U
c,c
G ) + µ2U
s,c
G −
CcG
P = 0 (A.42)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Rc is:
τRc
P +
[
a
(
Ws − Rc
n
−Rs
)
− t
]
Rc + µ2P
nP
−
(Lc
P − µ3 − 1
)
F cLL − (µ1 + k)F cKL − (µ2 + µ3 + 1)F cWL − µ5 = 0 (A.43)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Rs is:
nτRs
P +
t
P
(
nRs − 3nWs
2
− µ2P
)
+
an
2P
(
3W 2s
4
+R2s − 2RsWs −
R2c
n2
+
(
Ws − Rc
n
−Rs
)
2µ2P
n
)
−
(
nLs
P + µ3
)
F sLL + µ1F
s
KL + (µ2 + µ3)F
s
WL − nµ5 = 0 (A.44)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Kc is:
τKc
P +
(Lc
P − µ3 − 1
)
F cKL + (µ1 + k)F
c
KK + (µ2 + µ3 + 1)F
c
WK − µ6 = 0
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ks is:
nτKs
P +
(
nLs
P + µ3
)
F sKL − µ1F sKK − (µ2 + µ3)F sWK − nµ6 = 0 (A.45)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Wc is:
τWc
P +
(Lc
P − µ3 − 1
)
F cWL + (µ1 + k)F
c
WK + (µ2 + µ3 + 1)F
c
WW − µ4 = 0 (A.46)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ws is:
nτWs
P +
3t
2P [n(Ws −Rs) + µ2P] +
an
2P
(
R2c
n2
+
3RsWs
2
−R2s −
3W 2s
4
+
(
Rc
n
+Rs − 3
4
Ws
)
2Pµ2
n
)
+
(
nLs
P + µ3
)
F sWL − µ1F sWK − (µ2 + µ3)F sWW − nµ4 = 0 (A.47)
We can now prove the optimal behavior rules when labor taxes are available (21b)(24b).
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.39)(A.42) imply:
µ3 + 1 =
Rc
P , µ1 + k =
Kc
P , µ2 + µ3 + 1 =
Wc
P , µ2 =
Wc −Rc
P (A.48)
which can also be written as:
µ3 = −nRsP , µ1 = −
nKs
P , µ2 + µ3 = −
nWs
P , µ2 = −
n(Ws −Rs)
P (A.49)
using conditions (A.22)(A.24) and K = kP. Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and sub-
stituting Lj , j ∈ {c; s} from (2), we have:(Lc
P − µ3 − 1
)
F cXL + (µ1 + k)F
c
KX + (µ2 + µ3 + 1)F
c
WX − µ6 = 0 (A.50)(
nLs
P + µ3
)
F sXL − µ1F sXK − (µ2 + µ3)F sWX − nµ6 = 0 (A.51)
Inserting (A.48)(A.51) into each of the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.42)(A.47) entails respec-
tively:
CcG = Rc
(
U cG + U
c,c
G
)
+ nWscU
s,c
G (A.52)
τRc =
tWc
n
+
aW 2c
n2
+ Pµ5 (A.53)
τRs =
aW 2c
2n2
+
tWs
2
+
aW 2s
8
+ Pµ5 (A.54)
τKc = Pµ6 (A.55)
τKs = Pµ6 (A.56)
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τWc = Pµ4 (A.57)
τWs = −
aW 2c
2n2
+
aW 2s
8
+ Pµ4 (A.58)
in which (A.22)(A.24) and K = kP have been used to collect terms. Condition (A.52) proves
(24b). Moreover, inserting the taxation rules of the town (A.36)(A.38) into (A.54), (A.56)
and (A.58) implies µ4 = µ5 = µ6 = 0. Then, (A.52), (A.52), (A.52) become:
τRc =
tWc
n
+
aW 2c
n2
(A.59)
τKc = 0 (A.60)
τWc = 0 (A.61)
which proves conditions (21b)(23b).
Appendix C Proof of Result 2
The purpose of this section is to derive the municipalities' optimal policy rules when the tax
instrument set includes a tax/subsidy on labor. Speciﬁcally, we prove the towns' optimal
policy rules (32a)(34a) in subsection C.1 and the city's optimal policy rules (32b)(34b) in
subsection C.2.
C.1. Optimal policy rules of a town
In this subsection we prove the representative town's optimal policy rules (32a)(34a) when
labor taxation/subsidy is available. The proof is based on the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.25)
(A.31). However, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the labor tax (A.27) is ignored and
τWs is replaced by 0 everywhere it appears. Inserting the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to the tax instruments (A.25) and (A.26) into the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to labor
(A.31), substituting Ls from (2) and using Euler's theorem entails:
λ2 + λ3 − 1 = −WsP −
Φ
PDs . (A.62)
where
Φ ≡ a
2
[(
Wc
n
)2
−
(
Ws
2
)2]
, Ds ≡ 3
2
t+ a
(
Wc
n
+
Ws
4
)
− F sWW (A.63)
42
Appendix
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25) and (A.26), and condition
(A.62) entail:
λ3 − 1 = −RsP , λ1 = −
Ks
P , λ2 =
Rs −Ws
P −
Φ
PDs (A.64)
Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and substituting Ls from (2), we have:(Ls
P + λ3 − 1
)
F sXL − λ1F sXK − (λ2 + λ3 − 1)F sXW =
Φ
PDsF
s
XW , X ∈ {K;W} (A.65)
Inserting (A.62), (A.64) and (A.65) into the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to public
good provision (A.28), population (A.29) and capital (A.30), substituting Rc using (A.34) and
collecting terms implies:
RsU
s
G +WsU
s,s
G − CsG +
ΦU s,sG
Ds
= 0
τRs =
tWs
2
+
a
2
(
W 2c
n2
+
W 2s
4
)
− Φ (aWc + nt− nF
s
WL
)
nDs
τKs = −
ΦF s
WK
Ds
which proves conditions (32a)(34a) in Result 2.
C.2. Optimal policy rules of the city
We now turn to the proof of the optimal behavior rules of the city when labor taxes are not
available (32b)(34b). The proof is based on the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.39)(A.47), ignoring
the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the labor tax (A.41) is ignored and replacing τWc and
τWs everywhere they appear by 0.
Inserting the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25) and (A.26)
into the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to labor respectively of the city (A.46) and the town
(A.47), substituting Lj , j ∈ {c; s} from (2) and using Euler's theorem entails:
Wc
P − µ2 − µ3 − 1 = −
µ4
F cWW
(A.66)
µ4 = −
a
(
4W 2c − n2W 2s
)
F c
WW
2P (4aWc + n (6t+ aWs − 4nF cWW − 4F sWW)) (A.67)
where (A.22)(A.24) have been used to collect terms in (A.67). Combining (A.66) and (A.67)
to eliminate µ4, we obtain:
µ2 + µ3 + 1 =
Wc
P −
nΦ
PDc (A.68)
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where Φ is as deﬁned in (A.63) and:
Dc ≡ 3
2
t+ a
(
Wc
n
+
Ws
4
)
− F sWW − nF cWW (A.69)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.39) and (A.40), and condition
(A.62) entail:
µ3 + 1 =
Rc
P , µ1 + k =
Kc
P , µ2 =
Wc −Rc
P −
nΦ
PDc (A.70)
which can also be written as:
µ3 = −nRsP , µ1 = −
nKs
P , µ2 + µ3 = −
nWs
P , µ2 = −
n(Ws −Rs)
P −
nΦ
PDc (A.71)
using conditions (A.22)(A.24) and K = kP. Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and sub-
stituting Lj , j ∈ {c; s} from (2), we have:(Lc
P − µ3 − 1
)
F cXL + (µ1 + k)F
c
KX + (µ2 + µ3 + 1)F
c
WX − µ6 =
nΦ
PDcF
c
WX (A.72)(
nLs
P + µ3
)
F sXL − µ1F sXK − (µ2 + µ3)F sWX − nµ6 =
nΦ
PDcF
s
WX (A.73)
Inserting (A.68)(A.73) into each of the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.42)(A.47) entails respec-
tively:
CcG = RcU
c
G +RcU
c,c
G + nWscU
s,c
G −
nΦU s,cG
Dc
(A.74)
τRc =
tWc
n
+
aW 2c
n2
+ Pµ5 + Φcs
(
− t
Dc
− aWc
nDc
− nF
c
WL
Dc
)
(A.75)
τRs =
aW 2c
2n2
+
tWs
2
+
aW 2s
8
+ Pµ5 + Φ
(
− t
Dc
− aWc
nDc
+
F s
WL
Dc
)
(A.76)
τKc = Pµ6 +
nΦF c
WK
Dc
(A.77)
τKs = Pµ6 −
ΦF s
WK
Dc
(A.78)
in which (A.22)(A.24) and K = kP have been used to collect terms. Condition (A.74) proves
(34b). Moreover, inserting the taxation rules of the town (32a) and (33a) into (A.75) and
(A.77) implies
µ5 =
dRs
P −
aW 2c
2n2P +
aW 2s
8P + Φ
(
1
P +
t
PDc +
aWc
nPDc −
F s
WL
PDc
)
(A.79)
µ6 = −d
K
s
P +
ΦF s
WK
PDc (A.80)
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Finally, eliminating µ5 and µ6 from (A.74) and (A.77), and collecting terms proves conditions
(32b) and (33b).
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